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OGC 83-09455
22 November 1983


STAT MEMORANDUM FOR:
Chairman, SECOM

STAT FROM:
Chairman, UDIS

SUBJECT: UDIS Charter

1. At its 25 October 1983 meeting, the Unauthorized Disclosures Investigations Subcommittee (UDIS) unanimously approved the attached charter.

STAT 2. The new UDIS charter is forwarded to you for final approval by the Security Committee



e. Determine and recommend to the Security Committee corrective security measures to preclude the recurrence of disclosure or compromise of classified intelligence and intelligence sources and methods.

f. Determine and recommend to the Security Committee methods to increase security education and awareness regarding unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence and intelligence sources and methods.

g. Determine and recommend to the Security Committee improved methods for analyzing unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence and intelligence sources and methods.

h. Determine and recommend to the Security Committee policies and procedures for coordinating investigative efforts on unauthorized disclosures involving more than one department or agency.

i. Undertake those additional functions concerning the unauthorized disclosure of classified intelligence and intelligence sources and methods as the Security Committee may from time to time direct.

3. Intelligence Community Responsibilities. Members agencies are responsible for providing to the Subcommittee chairperson information relevant to the Subcommittee's function. STC-T

4. Composition and Organization.

a. The Subcommittee Chairperson ^{man} will be appointed by the Chairperson of the Security Committee. STC-T

b. The membership of the Subcommittee will be composed of representatives of those government entities represented on the Security Committee.

c. With the consent of affected members, the Subcommittee Chairperson ^{man} may appoint persons with special skills to provide support to the Subcommittee. STC-T

d. There shall be a representative from the Security Committee staff assigned to provide support to the Subcommittee as appropriate. The Subcommittee Chairperson ^{man} together with the representative from the Security Committee shall coordinate all matters between the Subcommittee and the Security Committee. STC-T

e. With the approval of the Security Committee, the Subcommittee Chairperson ^{chairman} may invite representatives of relevant United States Government entities to participate from time to time as appropriate. man
STC-T
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OGC 83-06583
12 August 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members and Alternates, Unauthorized
Disclosure Investigations Subcommittee

FROM: Chairman, Unauthorized Disclosure
Investigations Subcommittee

SUBJECT: Proposed UDIS Charter

1. Attached is a copy of the proposed UDIS Charter which was reviewed at our last meeting. This draft reflects the changes which were made at that meeting, as well as those that were received subsequently.

2. Please review this material in preparation for our next meeting. In the meantime, if you have any questions, feel free to contact me

STAT

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Chairman, Unauthorized Disclosure
Investigations Subcommittee

OGC:ALD:DEA:sm

Distribution:

Original - Subject (UDIS)

- 1 - All Members and Alternates
- 1 - EC
- 1 - CM
- 1 - DEA
- 1 - OGC Chrono
- 1 - DEA Signer

UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE
INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE CHARTER

The Unauthorized Disclosure Investigations Subcommittee operates under the authority of section 2.c and 4 of the Director of Central Intelligence Directive: Security Committee, effective 15 July 1982. In order to better delineate the missions, functions, responsibilities, and organization of the Subcommittee, the following provisions are established.

1. Mission: The Unauthorized Disclosure Investigations Subcommittee will advise and assist the Security Committee in discharging its responsibilities to ensure that programs are developed which protect intelligence sources and methods, and classified intelligence from unauthorized disclosure.

2. Functions: Under the general guidance of the Security Committee, the Subcommittee will perform the following functions:

a. Advise the Security Committee on security policies and procedures to ensure the implementation of the policies of the Director of Central Intelligence regarding the prevention of unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence and intelligence sources and methods.

b. Recommend to the Security Committee policies for the conduct by intelligence community components of security investigations of unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence and intelligence sources and methods.

c. Recommend to the Security Committee policies, procedures, and standards regarding those cases of unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence or intelligence sources and methods which may appropriately be referred by Federal agencies to the Attorney General for FBI investigation.

d. Recommend to the Security Committee policies, procedures, and standards regarding the application of appropriate legal and administrative sanctions in cases where investigation clearly identifies an employee, contractor or other Federal official who was responsible for an unauthorized disclosure of classified intelligence or intelligence sources and methods.

e. Determine and recommend to the Security Committee corrective security measures to preclude the recurrence of disclosure or compromise of classified intelligence and intelligence sources and methods.

f. Determine and recommend to the Security Committee methods to increase security education and awareness regarding unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence and intelligence sources and methods.

g. Determine and recommend to the Security Committee improved methods for analyzing unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence and intelligence sources and methods.

h. Determine and recommend to the Security Committee policies and procedures for coordinating investigative efforts on unauthorized disclosures involving more than one department or agency.

i. Undertake those additional functions concerning the unauthorized disclosure of classified intelligence and intelligence sources and methods as the Security Committee may from time to time direct.

3. Intelligence Community Responsibilities. Members agencies are responsible for providing to the Subcommittee chairperson information relevant to the Subcommittee's function.

4. Composition and Organization.

a. The Subcommittee Chairperson will be appointed by the Chairperson of the Security Committee.

b. The membership of the Subcommittee will be composed of representatives of those government entities represented on the Security Committee.

c. With the consent of affected members, the Subcommittee Chairperson may appoint persons with special skills to provide support to the Subcommittee.

d. There shall be a representative from the Security Committee staff assigned to provide support to the Subcommittee as appropriate. The Subcommittee Chairperson together with the representative from the Security Committee shall coordinate all matters between the Subcommittee and the Security Committee.

e. With the approval of the Security Committee, the Subcommittee Chairperson may invite representatives of relevant United States Government entities to participate from time to time as appropriate.

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Approved For Release 2009/03/23 : CIA-RDP94B00280R001200040020-0

S E C R E T

jwb 1.2.6
UDIS

16 June 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: All UDIS Members

25X1 FROM: [REDACTED]

Chairman, Unauthorized Disclosures
Investigations Subcommittee

SUBJECT: Summary of UDIS Meeting of 8 June 1982

The ninth meeting of the Unauthorized Disclosures Investigations Subcommittee (UDIS) was held on 8 June 1982 in Room 7E62 at 1030 hours. The meeting was scheduled to discuss the following items:

1. Status of the Report of the Interdepartmental Group on Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information;
2. FY 1984 SECOM Budget Report;
3. Coordinator Position;
4. Prioritizing Leaks;
5. Data Base;
- 25X1 6. Photocopy Security Systems. [REDACTED]

The following representatives were in attendance at the meeting:

MEMBERSORGANIZATION

25X1 [REDACTED]
M. M. Eid
R. J. Schoof
Bob Allen

Chairman
DIA
DIS
Air Force
Navy
NSA
CIA
State
25X1 FBI
25X1 [REDACTED]

Michael G. Considine
Charles Stapleton

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Douglas Miller
[redacted]DOE
CIA [redacted]I. Approval of Minutes

The minutes of the 11 May 1982 meeting were approved without any changes. [redacted]

 II. Status of the REPORT OF THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP ON UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION (Willard Report)

The UDIS Chairman reported that the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) intended to urge the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to take early action on the Willard Report as a helpful measure in dealing with unauthorized disclosures. Word has also been received from the NSC that action on the report is expected soon. [redacted]

III. Special SECOM Tasking

The UDIS Chairman expressed his appreciation to those UDIS members who responded to SECOM's request for a damage assessment on certain alleged unauthorized disclosures. That report went forward to the DCI and the results were shared with the UDIS members present. [redacted]

IV. FY 1984 SECOM Budget Report

The UDIS Chairman reported that SECOM met to discuss the various Subcommittee budget requests. The members voted to determine the priority ranking of each specific request. Results of voting on the UDIS proposals were as follows:

 FOIA Study
\$ 75,000

 High 10
Medium 1
Low 1

 Data Base Study
\$ 200,000

 High 2
Medium 9
Low 1

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Study of Long Term Damage	High	10
Caused by Leaks	Medium	2
\$ 50,000	Low	0

25X1 The SECOM Chairman will present the budget to the Intelligence Community Staff and attempt to obtain all off the monies requested by all of the Subcommittees. If total funding is not possible, however, cuts will be based upon the priorities expressed by the SECOM members. []

V. Coordinator Position

25X1 The discussion of the coordinator position was deferred due to the decision of the SECOM Chairman to request staff augmentation for the Security Committee. The proposed staff officer would provide assistance in the area of investigations of unauthorized disclosures as well as perform other duties for SECOM. []

VII. Prioritizing Leaks

25X1 Chuck Stapleton, FBI, presented a prioritization scheme developed by a UDIS sub-group consisting of himself, []
 25X1 [] NSA, [] CIA, and Tom Marcum, DOJ. During the discussion, the following suggestions were made:

- 25X1
- (1) that a checklist be added to indicate which factors were considered in each section;
 - (2) that the form be divided into two columns -- one assessing the effect on national security, and the other to evaluate the presence of investigative indicators;
 - (3) that a section for level of classification be added;
 - (4) that a section for evaluation of perceived impact on national policy be added;
 - (5) that the damage assessment sections be divided into damage to projects, damage to sources, and damage to collection methods; and

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

25X1 (6) that a probability study be done to
25X1 determine the appropriate numerical weighting
of the various factors. []

25X1 The format will be modified and presented to UDIS members at the
25X1 next meeting. []

VII. Data Base

25X1 Discussion was postponed until [] DIA, could
25X1 be present. []

VIII. Photocopy Security Systems

25X1 The UDIS Chairman gave a brief report on document
dissemination controls being developed by CIA's Office of
Research and Development (ORD). It was suggested that a
representative from ORD give such a briefing to UDIS in the near
future. []

IX. New Agenda Items

25X1 UDIS members were requested to submit any agenda items
within the purview of the Subcommittee. It was suggested that it
would be useful to have briefings by the various Public Affairs
Offices on how they operate with the media. A second suggestion
was that UDIS should explore the range of disciplinary actions
that are available for employees who leak classified
information. []

S E C R E T

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Security Committee

SECOM-D-080

10 March 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members, DCI Security Committee

STAT FROM:


Chairman

SUBJECT: Unauthorized Disclosures

1. The progress of our Unauthorized Disclosures Investigations Subcommittee will be expedited if the SECOM can provide them general guidance.

2. There are several basics we should have addressed long ago. The attached paper defines current policy, practices or procedures as I see them, along with some suggested changes. There may be others you have in mind that we should address.

3. Let us agree or agree to disagree on these at the 21 March SECOM meeting, and provide the results to the UDIS for implementation.

STAT 

Attachment

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

10 March 1982

Community Procedures for Dealing with Unauthorized Disclosures

The current status and proposed changes on various aspects of the subject include the following:

1. Current Status: Each department and agency is responsible for the protection of classified intelligence within its custody. If the material is disclosed, the holding agency is responsible for investigation and corrective measures.

Proposed Change: None

2. Current Status: In the event of a disclosure of intelligence material held in common by two or more agencies, the originating agency is considered to have primary responsibility for the investigation. It is the responsibility of appropriate authority in the receiving agency(ies) to determine whether and how they will respond to a request for assistance in the form of internal investigation. The Community has not defined what is an adequate scope of investigation in response to such a request. As things now stand, requesting agencies are rarely provided detailed reports of investigation in cases of this type.

Proposed Change: The Community define what is an adequate investigation in response to a request by an originating agency, and agree that the results of such investigations will be provided to requestors.

3. Current Status: There is a growing practice of referring leaks to the Department of Justice and requesting FBI investigation.

Proposed Change: The Department of Justice should continue to be informed of leaks. Investigative assistance of the FBI should be requested only after completion of internal investigations, and then only if there are unresolved leads in areas that Community agencies have no authority to investigate. Both Department of Justice and the FBI should be expected to conduct and report to the originating agency the results of internal investigations if intelligence they hold was leaked and they were asked by the originator to investigate.

4. Current Status: Each department and agency unilaterally determines and makes referrals to the Department of Justice on unauthorized disclosures of classified material, including intelligence material. This raises Community concerns about competition for limited FBI resources, and leaves to Justice the resolution of priorities.

SECRET

Proposed Change: Community members agree to segregate disclosures of national foreign intelligence and provide them for referral by the DCI. While this would not eliminate concerns about competition for FBI assistance, it would permit the DCI to prioritize intelligence leaks.

5. Current Status: There are no formally acknowledged contact points within the Community for requesting investigations of leaks of commonly held material. The system essentially depends upon the "old-boy" network. There are no agreed procedures that requestors can depend upon to satisfy their requests or to determine if they have been denied.

Proposed Change: Each Community department or agency identify to others a contact point and establish internal procedures to address and reply to requests for investigation of leaks. Contact officers should have rapid access to appropriate authority for determination of action and be able to task adequate resources to respond to all accepted requests.

6. Current Status: The Community has signalled mixed reactions on the desirability of a central data base of leaks. Both CIA and DIA have offered ADP assistance. The UDIS has long debated content and format. Common forms are now ready for use. There is no agreement on who will compile the data base.

Proposed Change: The Community adopt the use of the forms and the UDIS Chairman be designated to collect them and start development of a data base.

☐ UNCLASSIFIED☐ INTERNAL
USE ONLY☐ CONFIDENTIAL☐ SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Unauthorized Disclosures Working Group Charter

FROM:

STAT

Chief, CSG

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

Chairman, SECOM

17 MAY
197930 MAY
1979

2.

DD/S (INFO)

30 MAY
19791 JUN
1979

3.

D/S

1 JUN
19791 JUN
1979

4.

C/CSG

6/7/79

5.

~~CA. Newman~~

6.

P/S handle and keep me
informed.

7.

STAT

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13. STAT

STAT

26 JUN -

14.

15. STAT

4726. P/S see how this goes. I've asked [redacted] to serve as the CSG point of contact but I think leaks might better be a shared activity between you and [redacted]

6/7 - 6-8 Ray - Where do we stand on this?

[redacted] said [redacted] did not want format memo going to DCI since Sub Com on Unauth Disc exists de facto - there will be no enabling document - [redacted] has discussed with DCI on several occasions and verbally blessed the Sub Com.

FORM
3-62

610

USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS☐

SECRET

☐

CONFIDENTIAL

☐INTERNAL
USE ONLY☐

UNCLASSIFIED

☐

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

SECOM-D-523

17 MAY 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, DCI Security Committee

FROM:

[redacted]
Chief, Community Security Group

SUBJECT: Unauthorized Disclosures Working Group Charter

1. Following our discussion yesterday I pulled a copy of the proposed attachment 5 to DCID 1/11 which will serve as the charter of the Unauthorized Disclosures Subcommittee.

2. [redacted] informs that he personally has no problem with it. He has provided copies to members of his Group and requested their comments. No response as of 17 May. We will be seeing Mike tomorrow and will ask him for whatever he has at that time.

3. I believe that the idea of sending copies of all leak reports to Justice is appropriate. Of these very few would be so serious as to warrant FBI investigation. However, by sending down all reported unauthorized disclosures we would provide Justice Department with a better appreciation of the scope of the problem. They may be more willing to attend to the rare request for investigation when they clearly see that we are not arbitrarily or capriciously asking them to look into disclosures.

4. I think it is necessary to get the point across that we believe in the salutary effect of investigations even though prosecutions is not the sine qua non.

STAT

5. [] called me yesterday and asked for Dave Ryan's number in anticipation of getting the Bureau's view on investigations of leaks.

STAT

6. I have not been able to contact Ryan to double check what he said to [] but I believe we both know Ryan's position, i.e., submit reports of all leaks to Justice under the authority of E.O. 12036 with drop copies to the Bureau.

STAT

Attachment



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Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied